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INTERCHURCH RELATIONS IN POST-PERESTROIKA EASTERN EUROPE: 
 
A SHORT HISTORY OF AN ECUMENICAL MELTDOWN 
 
By Joseph Loya 
 
Dr. Joseph Loya, O.S.A. is a Roman Catholic priest and assistant professor of religious 
studies at Villanova University, Villanova, Pennsylvania. He received the B.A. degree 
from Cleveland State University, the M.A. from the Washington Theological Union, and 
the Ph.D. degree from Fordham University. In 1993 he was elected to the Executive 
Board of the North American Academy of Ecumenists. 
 
 
"The Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church have been granted the grace of once 
again recognizing one another as sister Churches and of journeying towards full 
communion." (Pope John Paul II)1 
 
"We have come to you bringing with love the ethos of freedom in Christ, together with 
the rich tradition of our orthodox East. At the same time, we have come to receive what 
the Latin West has to offer to the common cause of the reconciliation of our Churches. 
We have come for an exchange of spiritual treasures, in a spirit of love and esteem." 
(Ecumenical Patriarch Dimitrios I)2 
 
"Catholic and Orthodox have fought each other with word and sword. Each has tried to 
humiliate the other, to dominate the other, to suppress the other where possible... (but) a 
new climate has been created. We can meet as sharers in divine life to search out new 
way for healing old wounds as well as those which are more recent." (Cardinal Johannes 
Willebrands, former President of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity)3 
 
These sentiments, all spoken in 1988, reflected the elation and hope of more than a 
quarter-century of bilateral theological dialogue dedicated to healing the long and 
difficult schism between the Roman Catholic Church and the Churches of the Orthodox 
East. The substantial list of consensus statements forged by the International Joint 
Commission for Theological Dialogue Between the Roman Catholic Church and Eastern 
Orthodox Churches includes the following titles: "The Mystery of the Eucharist in the 
Light of the Mystery of the Holy Trinity" (Munich, 1982), "Faith, Sacraments, and the 
Unity of the Church" (Bari, 1987), "The Sacrament of Order in the Sacramental Structure 
of the Church" (Valamo, 1988). Such concord can be seen as the theological fruit of 
earlier dramatic symbols of ecumenical intent such as the historic embrace of Pope Paul 
VI and Patriarch Athenagoras of Constantinopolis (1964), the mutual lifting of the 
anathemas of 1054 (1965), and subsequent exchanges of visits and messages.4 In 1988 it 
would have been difficult to conceive that these events and statements would so soon be 
looked upon as markers of the halcyon days of interchurch relations; as of this writing, 
the relationship between Catholic and Orthodox Churches is sorely tested by feelings of 
rancor, bitterness and mistrust. 
 
How did the former climate of warm mutual regard degenerate so quickly into the present 
heated atmosphere of charge and countercharge? A hint may have been provided as far 
back as 1965 when a perceptive Orthodox commentator characterized Vatican II's Decree 
on the Eastern Catholic Churches as a "gunpowder keg, capable of blowing sky-high the 
dialogue being pursued between Orthodox East and the Latin West."5 The world 
witnessed the barrel blow in 1990 in a kind of spontaneous combustion not wholly unlike 
the unleashing of destructive powers when interethnic or interracial tensions reach their 
flashpoints. Alternatively, perhaps it would be more apt to describe the situation as one in 
which a critical mass of long suppressed Roman Catholic, Orthodox, and Eastern 
Catholic antipathies were detonated by a potent charge of political freedom. Ground zero-
-the Western Ukraine. My purpose here is to provide a chronology of events that 
conditioned this ecumenical Chernobyl and to describe the extent and intensity of the 
fallout as it continues to contaminate the atmosphere of interchurch relations throughout 
the ecumenical world. 
 
The roots of the complex relation under study reach back to the sixteenth century and the 
eastern regions of the United Kingdom of Poland-Lithuania. At the close of the sixteenth 
century Ukrainian Orthodox bishops labored under difficult circumstances: from the east 
came frequent and onerous demands for funds issued by the Patriarch of Constantinople 
and, closer to home, the Church of Moscow's growing shadow of influence. To the west 
was the enviable degree of education, pensions, and parliamentary membership afforded 
to Roman Catholic clergy. At home the cultural and ecclesial identity of their people 
were being threatened by the cuius regio, illius et religio solution of the Peace of 
Augsburg.6 Union with the Church of Rome with the guaranteed right to maintain their 
traditional Orthodox ecclesial life presented itself as the most advantageous avenue of 
recourse. This was in fact the way taken, through the instrument known as the 1596 
Union of Brest-Litovsk.7 By the late eighteenth century two-thirds of Western Ukraine 
was Byzantine Rite Catholic. Meanwhile, other such unions were established with parts 
of Orthodox and non-Chalcedonian communities in the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1646), 
Romania (1698), Armenia (1742), Syria (1742), and, later, Egypt (1895). 
 
All such unions--all such expressions of recognition of the Pope's primacy both in honor 
and jurisdiction--have been consistently interpreted by the Vatican as revivifications of 
the 1439 Catholic-Orthodox reunion council of Ferrara-Florence. This council, in turn, 
was considered a return to Catholic-Orthodox unity ante 1054, a period considered most 
reflective of the unity intended by Christ when He prayed that "all may be one so that the 
world may believe" (John 17). The Eastern Orthodox, for their part, viewed all such 
partial unions as crass and blatant examples of papal "sheep stealing" and the willful 
disruption of Orthodox communion effected through greed, lies, pride, ambition and false 
promises. Eastern Catholic communities came to be considered by Orthodoxy as 
traitorous splinter groups sadly used and abused by the Church of Rome as they were first 
subverted then elevated to represent the "return of the Eastern schismatics."8 That Rome 
has through the centuries trumpeted the Eastern Catholic communities as "bridge 
churches" to the Orthodox while at the same time utilizing them as proselytic spearheads 
served only to exacerbate Orthodox enmity.9 
 
Attention now is turned to post-World War II Ukraine, a spoil of war garnered from 
Germany. Stalin was well aware of Orthodox animus towards Eastern Catholicism and 
knew that he could not afford to accommodate anti-Soviet churches owing their 
ecclesiastical allegiance to an authority situated beyond the Soviet borders. In 1945 he 
began to subject Eastern Catholic hierarchy, clergy, and leading laypersons to arrest, 
imprisonment, exile, execution. In I946 the Soviet government stagemanaged an 
Orthodox reunion synod (the Council of Lvov) in which the Catholic Union Council of 
Brest-Litovsk was rescinded. Eastern Catholicism was declared unlawful and henceforth 
non-existent within Soviet boarders; all Eastern Catholics were now to be integrated into 
the Orthodox communities. 
 
The Orthodox, instead of protesting the injustice, celebrated the dictates of this council 
and received Eastern Catholic properties and structures. Since its ranks were filled by the 
former Eastern Catholics, the Russian Orthodox Church took its turn to apply triumphant 
"return" rhetoric, this time to a situation in which the freedom of conscience of a 
particular ecclesial body had been blatantly violated.10 Catholics refusing to allow 
themselves to be coerced into Orthodoxy took up the life of a catacomb church. 
 
In the 1960's and 1970's Khrushchev's de-Stalinization measures quickened the resolve of 
the underground church to press for its re-legalization and repossession of churches. 
During the period of 1986-1987, in the spirit of glasnost and perestroika, nearly all 
political prisoners were released, a percentage of whom was to become the backbone of a 
movement for human, national and religious rights in Ukraine. Catholic activist 
organizations generated campaigns for the restoration of the Church's status quo ante 
1945. Public Catholic religious services were being attended by huge throngs of 
worshippers at a time when official channels to the world abroad were still denying their 
existence. Petition drives, the publication of the uncensored journal Khrystyyanskyi holos 
(Christian Voice), hunger strikes, confrontations with governmental authorities, plus 
written, audio and video appeals to the West were all employed in the effort to publicize 
the plight of the Catholic Church in Ukraine.11 
 
The degree of sharpness in partisan polemics quickly escalated. Stepan Khmara, 
Ukrainian Catholic activist leader, emphasized in 1988 "the unconditional inadmissibility 
of the Russian Orthodox Church having any say in the future of the Ukrainian Catholic 
Church. He and his committee would not recognize the legitimacy of any discussion in 
which the Russian leadership played a role, either with or without the participation of the 
Vatican."12 For the Orthodox side Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev spoke of "self-styled 
Uniate zealots" who "are out to set the Church and the State against each other and make 
a rift between Orthodoxy and Catholicism. And if--God forbid--the Ukrainian Catholic 
Church acquires a legal status, its zealots will brew a terrible strife and hinder the effort 
for beneficial change in Soviet life - to live in peace and concord."13 
 
In July 1989, the reformist publication Moscow News challenged the official version of 
the "reunion of the Uniates," charged the Russian Orthodox Church with having 
consistently supported Stalin's repressive measures against the followers of the Uniate 
Church and warned that attempts to continue a repressive policy against the Uniates 
threaten to both aggravate social tensions and complicate the USSR's relations with other 
countries. An article in the October issue of the mass circulation journal Argumenty i 
facty helped shatter the pretense of canonicity of the Russian Orthodox in Ukraine and 
was perceived widely as sure portent of a policy shift in Moscow. The official Soviet, and 
therefore Russian Orthodox, rejoinder at this time was to label the Ukrainian Catholic 
Church as a purely political, nationalist and separatist organization and therefore 
ineligible for registration.14 
 
In August of 1989 Papal initiatives for resolution of the situation resulted in the opening 
of negotiations between the Vatican and the Orthodox Moscow Patriarchate. The latter 
proposed the de facto dissolution of the Eastern Catholic Church by imposing upon 
Eastern Catholics the choice of becoming either Eastern Orthodox or Roman Catholic.15 
Of course, the Pope declined; no greater insult could be visited upon the memory of 
Eastern Catholics who have suffered and died for their church. Also, resolving the 
tension between two Churches - Roman Catholic and Orthodox--by the elimination of a 
third Church--the Eastern Catholic - would be unconscionable ecumenical methodology. 
In October the Pope addressed a gathering of exiled Ukrainian Catholic bishops, 
assembled in Rome, with his strongest statement to date on the necessity of recognizing 
the rights of the Eastern Catholic Church in the Soviet Union.16 
 
Between 19 and 21 October 1989, Archbishop Angelo Sadano, The Vatican's Secretary 
for Interstate Relations, met in Moscow with a Soviet delegation that included Gorbachev 
and Foreign Minister Eduard Sheverdnadze. Again in the spirit of perestroika, the Holy 
See was assured that a new law on freedom of conscience and religious organizations 
would legalize the Ukrainian Catholic Church, though the practical aspects of legalization 
would have to be resolved through agreement among the Holy See, the Soviet 
Government, and the Moscow Patriarchate in the context of closer ecumenical dialogue 
between the Roman Catholic and Russian Orthodox Churches.17 The trustworthiness of 
this assurance seemed to be confirmed when, in concurrence with Gorbachev's visit to 
Rome in search of political rapprochement with the Vatican, the following statement was 
published December First by the official Novosti News Agency under the rubric 
Declaration of the Council of Religious Affairs attached to the Council of Ministers of 
the Ukrainian SSR: "Subject to their unconditional observance of the Constitution of the 
Ukrainian SSR and the legislation on cults, Greek Catholics may enjoy all rights which 
are provided by law on religious association in the Ukrainian SSR . . . Questions of the 
registration of these or other religious congregations will be decided in accordance with 
the will expressed by the believers themselves."18 
 
Ukrainian Catholics received the statement as something wholly inadequate to the scope 
of their demands, especially in light of subsequent commentary by the chairman of the 
Ukrainian Council of Religious Affairs to the effect that the statement was only an 
expression of the Council's willingness to recognize Eastern Catholics as one of any 
number of "groups of believers" eligible to apply for governmental registration and to 
request leases on unused houses of worship from the authorities. There was to be no 
question of returning Eastern Catholic churches or any other ecclesiastical property 
which had been nationalized, nor would the Council recognize the corporate, canonical 
structure and hierarchy of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. The response of Ukrainian 
Catholics was to commence the physical take-over of their former churches from the 
Russian Orthodox Church. Within six months nearly thirteen hundred churches were so 
taken in Ukraine and Eastern Slovakia.19 
 
The Orthodox reacted with immediate and vehement protest. Eastern Catholics were 
charged with illegal seizure, intimidation, persecution of Orthodox believers, inciting to 
riot, arson and murder.20 In response, a January 1990 declaration issued by a meeting of 
a wide spectrum of Eastern Catholic intelligentsia and informal organizations called for 
an end to this alleged disinformation disseminated by the Soviet Press and the Eastern 
Orthodox Church. This call, along with a charge that the Council of Religious Affairs 
was stonewalling registration procedures pertaining to Eastern Catholic interests, was 
appended to following list spelling out the terms upon which the Eastern Catholic Church 
should to legalized: the Eastern Catholic Church should be politically rehabilitated; the 
Church should have the rights of juridical person restored to it, and accordingly, all its 
property, including churches, art treasures, relics and cathedrals, returned to it; the 1946 
Council of Lvov should be declared a violent, anti-constitutional act of Stalinism; 
conditions should be created to allow for theological seminaries, publication of religious 
literature, and religious education.21 It has been pointed out by an American 
commentator that the apparent Eastern Catholic commitment to a program of restitutio in 
integrum, while seemingly a logical solution to difficulties achieved through adherence to 
legal principle, in fact does little to rectify the complexity of the situation. Consider the 
case of the venerable Monastery of St. Nicholas near Mukachevo: initially established by 
the Orthodox in the end of the fourteenth century, the residence of an Eastern Catholic 
Bishop in the seventeenth century, confiscated by the Soviets and given to the Orthodox 
for use as a convent in the twentieth century, currently demanded to be returned by the 
Eastern Catholics. The answer to the question "to whom does the monastery rightfully 
belong?" is by no means clear.22 
 
Also in January of 1990, Vatican representatives led by Cardinal Willebrands and 
including Archbishop Miroslav Marusyn, the Ukrainian Secretary of the Congregation 
for the Eastern Churches, met with a Russian Orthodox delegation in Moscow to produce 
"Recommendations on the Normalization of Relations Between the Orthodox and 
Catholics of the Eastern Rite in Western Ukraine."23 It was agreed that the 
"normalization of the position...should guarantee for Catholics of the Eastern Rite the 
right to religious activity, recognized for all, in accordance with the Constitution of the 
USSR and Soviet legislation (paragraph 1). It emphasized that "it is extremely important 
to avoid all unlawful actions especially those involving violence...which are incompatible 
with the spirit of Christianity and must be condemned" (paragraph 4). The Orthodox, 
having consistently taken the position that disputes should be resolved by mutual 
negotiation in such a way as to take into consideration the present religious affinities 
within a particular region, inserted in the "Recommendations" a suggestion that the issue 
of property ownership should be decided by local plebiscites in the difficult cases where a 
parish is divided and each community seeks exclusive use of the Church. The whole 
program of negotiations and plebiscites was strenuously rejected by Ukrainian Catholics. 
Said Ivan Hel, one of the most ardent and vocal advocates of Ukrainian Catholic 
interests: "the lawful owners (i.e., the Ukrainian Catholics) are being asked to plead with 
those who stole their property."24 
 
Another of the Moscow recommendations was the creation of a joint quadripartite 
commission for the resolution of practical questions that would arise in the process of 
normalizing relations between Eastern Catholic and Orthodox Churches. This 
commission, composed of representatives of the Holy See (headed by Archbishop 
Marusyn), the Moscow Patriarchate (headed by Metropolitan Mofody of Voronezh and 
Lipetsk), Ukrainian Orthodox (led by Bishop Irenei of Lvov) and Ukrainian Eastern 
Catholics (led by Archbishop Volodimir Sterniuk of Lvov) did indeed meet in March. 
From the beginning the Ukrainian Catholics expressed dissatisfaction with the 
constitution, conduct and constraints of on the agenda imposed by the commission. The 
meeting completely ran aground when Archbishop Sterniuk and other Eastern Catholic 
bishops walked out in protest over the Moscow Patriarchate's refusal to concede that the 
1946 Council of Lvov was invalid or to recognize the canonical, corporate nature of the 
Eastern Catholic Church and its hierarchy. They followed up their action with a letter of 
protest extremely critical of the policies and attitudes of Soviet authorities and the 
Orthodox Church. Also, the dissenters registered their desire that the head of the 
Ukrainian Church, Cardinal Myroslav Lubachivsky, be raised by the Pope to his rightful 
rank of Patriarch.25 Ukrainian Catholic Auxiliary Bishop Julian Voronowsky portrayed 
Bishop Marusyn as one who "did more damage to the Eastern Rite Ukrainian Church in 
ten days than the KGB did in forty-four years."26 Stepan Khmara, now on the new 
People's Deputies of Ukraine, wrote a letter of protest to the Pope in which he said "we 
will never allow our Ukrainian Catholic Church to become an object of trade between the 
Vatican and the Moscow Patriarchate. We resolutely protest at the manner in which the 
Vatican is conducting its policy."27 Commentator Colin Davey correctly discerns the 
feeling out of which statements of this timbre proceed: for over forty years the Eastern 
Catholic Church demonstrated it resilience and endurance in the face of severe 
persecution, and now it wishes to play its part in inter-Church relations in its own name 
as an equal partner having its own identity. From the Eastern Catholic view others cannot 
simply make decisions on its own behalf and expect such a process to succeed.28 
 
Meanwhile, the revival of civil society, its growing politicization, and the rapid growth of 
the national democratic movement asserted their effects on the religious situation in 
Ukraine. The direct elections of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and the lower-level 
soviets in March provided the occasion in which advocates of national cultural, linguistic, 
and religious demands awakened to the fact that they could influence the resolution of 
their demands through the ballot box. In Western Ukraine the democratic, pro-Catholic 
block registered an overwhelming victory.29 The new, popularly elected authorities set 
about implementing the Eastern Catholic agenda. Following Ukraine's declaration of the 
sovereignty on 16 July 1990, the republican authorities proceeded to assume, at the 
expense of Moscow, control over church-state relations within the republic. On 15 June 
1991, the governmental Council on Religious Affairs registered the statute of the Eastern 
Catholic Archdiocese of Lvov; it is now with an officially sanctioned Eastern Catholic 
Church that the Moscow Patriarchate must deal. 
 
In another part of Eastern Europe, tensions is Romania escalated on 19 May 1991, when 
Byzantine Catholics took possession of their old cathedral in Blaj. The Romanian 
Orthodox Patriarch Teoctist reacted sharply, demanding suspension of all dialogue with 
the Catholic Church for the duration of the pontificate of Pope John Paul II.30 
 
Besides the issue of Uniatism and the very existence of Eastern Catholic Churches, 
another factor contributing to the neuralgia of the moment is summed by the term 
"proselytism." In the midst of the tumult caused by property ownership issues, Pope John 
Paul II has proceeded to appoint bishops to cities in Siberia, Kazahkstan, Belarus, and to 
Moscow itself. That these appointments were made in the absence of prior notification 
having been sent to local government and Orthodox church authorities aroused the ire of 
the Moscow Patriarchate and of the extended Orthodox world.31 These unilateral actions, 
plus the presence in Russia of Protestant evangelical missions and heavily financed 
efforts of pious Catholic organizations, awaken among the Orthodox an old and familiar 
fear: ever since the Reformation Russian Christians have taken deep umbrage at having 
often been targeted for concerted "conversion" attempts by zealous groups from the 
Christian West. In light of this fact the Vatican's recent revival of its Pontificia 
Commissio pro Russia (in abeyance since the beginning of the cold war) did nothing the 
allay apprehension within the Moscow Patriarchate. In November of 1991, Patriarch 
Alexis II of Moscow even expressed distrust of Archbishop Francis Hurley's efforts to 
found a missionary center in Magadan along the Eastern Siberian coast.32 It is of little 
wonder that the Pope's invitation to the Orthodox to participate in the December 1991 
Roman Catholic Synod "The New Evangelization of Europe" received such a cold 
reception in the Orthodox world.33 By way of comment, fair assessment could affirm 
that to the extent that the protests reflect a Church rendered vulnerable by a seventy-year 
inability to be socially involved with its own adherents (through the fostering of church 
schools, hospitals, universities, charitable organizations and the like), Orthodox 
defensiveness is to a considerable degree understandable. On the other hand, to the extent 
the complaints may represent characteristic Russian xenophobia or the unwillingness (or 
inability) to compete in the new free market of religion and ideas, a deep and difficult 
self-assessment as to Orthodoxy's ability to recapture and hold the religious imagination 
of its own believers seems to be in order. 
 
Fear of proselytism also inflames intra-Catholic relations as it intensifies the chronic 
contentiousness that exists between native Poles and Ukrainians. (In post World War II 
Poland most Byzantine Catholic properties went to the Roman Catholic Church.) In 
December 1990 the Pope unilaterally appointed a Roman Catholic bishop to Lvov. 
Appointments of Polish ordinaries to other Ukrainian locals followed. In an expression of 
its dissatisfaction, the city council of Lvov refused to make the former residence of the 
Polish Archbishop available to the new incumbent, and the plane carrying the visiting 
Polish Primate Cardinal Glemp was turned back upon being refused permission to land in 
that city. Meanwhile, in the Ukrainian city of Peremyshl' (Premysl) just inside the Polish 
border, the Poles refused to allow the new Eastern Catholic bishop of Peremyshl' access 
to the Eastern Catholic cathedral and residence. These conflicts have continued and 
worsened.34 
 
How have these developments affected the theological deliberations conducted by 
Orthodox and Roman Catholics on the international and national levels? Clearly, the 
events have overtaken the theological discussions. Already in October-November 1986, 
the Third Pre-Synodical Pan-Orthodox Conference at Chambesy, Geneva, proposed that 
"the realities of Uniatism, as well as proselytism enacted through Uniatism or by other 
means, should be examined in one of the stages of the dialogue, as a priority of 
ecclesiology."35 The International Joint Commission for Theological Dialogue between 
the Roman Catholic Church and Orthodox Churches adopted the suggestion at its 1988 
meeting in Finland. A mixed subcommission met from 26 to 31 January, 1990, in Vienna 
to study the problems raised by the problematic nature of the existence of the Eastern 
Churches united with Rome. The work of the subcommission was conducted under the 
joint chairmanship of Msgr. Edward Cassidy (chair of the Pontifical Council for the 
Unity of Christians) and Archbishop Stylianos of Australia (representing the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate of Constantinople). The result was important agreement in principle on 
ecclesiology, proselytism, and on the use of force in settling disputes: on the basis of their 
discussions the subcommission unanimously agreed that Uniatism is no longer 
considered to be a viable model for the union of Churches, since the ecclesiology within 
which it developed did not have as its inspiration the Tradition common to the undivided 
Churches. For this reason, the search for unity should have as its model that of sister 
Churches, within the framework of eucharistic communion ecclesiology.36 It was agreed 
that any form of soteriological exclusivism contradicts the ecclesiology of sister 
Churches and that any kind of proselytism violating the religious freedom of conscience 
and using illicit or illegitimate means has to be rejected. The subcommission declared 
that on no account should forceful methods be used to solve any problems whatsoever 
between the Churches, since the use of violence in presenting claims is contrary to 
Christian teaching and is condemned unhesitatingly.37 
 
The next plenary meeting of the Joint Commission took place at Freising, Munich, 6 to 
15 June 1990. The Commission was scheduled to take up the study of the theological 
consequences of the sacramental structure of the Church and particularly the relationship 
between authority and conciliarity in the Church, but due to the gravity of recent events 
the whole meeting was dedicated to the questions posed by the origin, existence and 
development of the Catholic Churches of the Byzantine Rite. The Commission explained 
that "because of the conflictual situation existing in some regions between the Catholic 
Churches of the Byzantine Rite and the Orthodox Church, 'Uniatism' is an urgent 
problem to be treated with priority over all other subjects to be discussed in the 
dialogue."38 Uniatism was then defined as "the effort which aims to bring about the unity 
of the Church by separating from the Orthodox Church communities or Orthodox faithful 
without taking into account that, according to ecclesiology, the Orthodox Church is a 
sister Church which itself offers the means of grace and salvation....Where 'Uniatism' has 
been employed as a method, it failed to achieve its goal of bringing the Churches closer 
together; rather, it provoked new divisions. The situation thus created has been a source 
of conflict and suffering, and these have deeply marked the memory of the collective 
consciousness of the two Churches. On the other hand, for ecclesiological reasons, the 
conviction has grown that other ways must be sought out." On the practical level, the 
Commission registered the following convictions: 1) religious liberty is both "a right 
which must be totally respected" and "a gift of the Spirit for the building up of the Body 
of Christ" which therefore "excludes absolutely all violence, direct or indirect, physical or 
moral"; 2)proselytism is to be excluded as a "misuse of pastoral energy" and a "counter-
witness to those who observe critically the way the Churches use their new liberty and 
who are ready to detect and utilize every sign of rivalry. This means that the pastor of a 
community should not interfere in a community entrusted to another pastor, but rather 
should give a common witness to the world in agreement with this other pastor and with 
all others, in order that all their communities progress towards the same goal, that of a 
common witness to the world in which they live." 
 
Concern over Uniatism sustained its impetus when in January, 1991, the representatives 
of the various Orthodox Churches involved in the international dialogue issued the 
following statement: "It is clear that if this problem [the rebirth of Uniatism] is not 
resolved, all efforts by Orthodox and Roman Catholics to improve their relations and 
attain the goals of their dialogue will be in vain. For this reason, the participants think 
Uniatism should now be the exclusive subject of the dialogue."39 
 
The Coordinating Committee of the Joint Commission assembled between 10 and 15 
June 1991, in Rome to compose a single document on the basis of three papers prepared 
within a year by three subcommissions. The first convened in December of 1990 in 
Rome, the second in March of 1991 in Rome, and the third in April of the same year in 
Vienna. The working document thus compiled is entitled "Uniatism as a Method of 
Union in the Past, and the Present Search for Full Communion."40 Beyond the Freising 
Document "Uniatism as a Method" provided the added component of a historical reading 
of the origin of Eastern Catholic Churches and their subsequent histories in the context of 
Orthodox-Roman Catholic relations. Otherwise, the call for the cessation of violence and 
proselytism was underscored, the counselling of local pastors to wisdom and peace was 
elaborated, the necessity for solutions obtained through dialogue conducted in a calm 
atmosphere was reinforced, and the commitment to guard the principle of religious 
freedom was re-asserted. With regard to freedom of conscience Pope John Paul II's letter 
of 31 May 1991, was cited as a reminder that freedom of conscience and the right of 
everyone to adhere to a Church of his/her own choice is to be respected (paragraph 19). 
This working document was to have been the prime agenda item for a meeting of the 
Joint Commission scheduled for May 1992, but the meeting was postponed a year at the 
behest of Orthodox participants feeling the need to attend to pressing concerns in home 




The high walls of separation that have inflicted deep psychic wound in Eastern European 
Christians cannot be quickly and simply skirted, forgotten or ignored by these peoples. 
Nor can the walls be leveled by shear moral indignation emanating from those of western 
liberal traditions for whom historical memory is relatively short. The pull of the future is 
felt more than the weight of the past. Interchurch relations are comparatively cordial, and 
religion and law, theology, and jurisprudence have long since been disengaged. The 
obstacles to unity can only be transcended (employing the term in the fullness of its 
religious connotation) in the spiritual reconciliation that accompanies the healing of 
memories and re-commitment to the unity envisioned in the Sacred Writ. 
 
"No one comes to this controversy with clean hands."41 Western Christians, Catholic and 
Protestant, bear the stigma of a millennium of patronizing arrogance toward Orthodoxy. 
Many Eastern Catholics feel that the Vatican continues to treat them as members of a 
secondary rite within the Roman Catholic Church in contradiction to the dictates of the 
Vatican II's Decree on the Eastern Catholic Churches. The Orthodox come with the 
shame of easy acquiescence in governmental suppression of other churches and with 
bankrupted credibility for playing the role of mouthpiece for the Soviet propaganda 
machine in international ecumenical discussions of the past four decades. Eastern 
Catholics have at times come dangerously close to equating vigilance over cultural purity 
and national allegiance with the preservation of the Saving Truth. 
 
Already the darkness of the hurt-filled situation reviewed here is being penetrated by 
positive and hopeful signals great and small: every pronouncement and document on the 
subject from the International Joint Commission for Theological Dialogue in the past four 
years has included a commitment to continue dialogue among the Churches despite the 
pressures of spontaneous injurious events in the homelands; Uniatism had rightly been 
condemned as an ecumenical method while the right of Eastern Catholics to maintain 
their faith and church life has been affirmed as something to be honored and guarded; the 
Commission has committed itself to recognizing Eastern Catholic Churches as 
participants possessing an autonomous and respected voice in dialogue; Orthodox Bishop 
Arkadiy of Magadan and Archbishop Hurley have sealed through an exchange of gifts 
the intention to seek a common course of action with regard to the latter's missionary 
institute in Siberia. 
 
Of great significance is the fact that as of late the Vatican has given evidence of increased 
sensitivity with regard to evangelism in the ecumenical context. On 1 June, 1992, the 
Pontificia Commissio pro Russia issued "General Principles and Practical Norms for 
Coordinating the Evangelizing Activity and Ecumenical Commitment of the Catholic 
Church in Russia and in Other Countries of the Community of Independent States 
(C.I.S.)."42 Pertinent excerpts read as follows (emphasized phrases are original to the 
document): 
 
Apostolic activity in the territories of the C.I.S. and Eastern Europe requires of Catholics 
both fidelity to their own mission and a true concern for their Orthodox brothers and 
sisters, with respect for the latter's faith, so that they can join with them in preparing for 
the ecclesial unity willed by Christ. (Section I, no. 4). 
 
In full respect for religious freedom, which is an inalienable right of every person, 
Bishops and priests will take care to consider attentively the motives of those who ask to 
enter the Catholic Church. Such people must also be made aware of their obligations 
toward their own community of origin. (no.5) 
 
It is of course true that the activity of the Catholic Church in the territories of the C.I.S., 
which are so deeply imbued with the presence and the activity of the Orthodox and 
Armenian traditions, needs to be conducted in ways which differ substantially from those 
of the mission "ad gentes". . . . The Latin Rite Catholic Church in those lands must 
therefore hold in great esteem the Eastern traditions which are deeply rooted in them, and 
particularly those of the Orthodox Church. Having emerged from a long period of 
persecution, difficulties and conditioning of every kind, the Orthodox Church is now 
faced with the challenge of a new evangelization of traditionally Orthodox peoples who 
have been brought up in atheism. Therefore, in fraternal dialogue with the local Bishops 
of the Orthodox Church and with full respect for the citizens' religious confession, the 
Pastors of the Latin Church should try to promote cooperation with the Orthodox Church 
in all areas where this is possible, so that everyone may become clearly aware of the 
unity in charity which must reign between the two Churches, as a prelude to full ecclesial 
communion." (no. 7). 
 
The Bishops and Apostolic Administrators, who are responsible for and guarantee all 
pastoral initiatives...must take care to ensure that no activity undertaken within their 
ecclesiastical circumscriptions can be easily misconstrued as a `parallel structure of 
evangelization'. . . both false ecumenism and 'immoderate zeal' are to be avoided. 
(Section II, no. 2). 
 
 
May these and all future interactions between the churches as they attempt to deal with 
these difficult situations be marked not so much by the conventional problem solving and 
mediational techniques common to the contemporary professional world but by the 





The seventh plenary session of the Joint International Commission for the Theological 
Dialogue between the Catholic and the Orthodox Churches took place from 17 to 24 June 
1993, in Balamand, Lebanon. The following is a listing of the prohibitions, rejections and 
affirmations that were issued from that meeting. Rejected are ecclesiologies that envision 
one's own church as the sole locus of salvation and initiatives (identified by the term 
"uniatism") that seek unity through the fusion of one church to another or the absorption 
of one church in another. Among that which is subject to prohibition is the formation of 
proselytizing missionary apostolates having the goal of converting or `bringing back' 
individuals or groups to one's own church, glorying in or drawing argument from marks 
of persecution and suffering in order to accuse or disparage the other church, the 
proffering of financial, educational, or material benefits in a manner that might 
compromise a believer's freedom of conscience and religious liberty, the use of violence 
to occupy a place of worship; unilateral establishment of parallel pastoral organizations 
or activities, taking recourse to the intervention of civil authorities for practical solutions 
to the problems that arise between Churches or local communities, the dissemination of 
tendentious and misleading information to the mass-media. Like the anathemas and 
disciplinary canons of old that can be read as a kind of photographic negative that 
develops into a positive picture of what was threatening the unity and peace of the 
Church in those former times, so are these proscriptions revelatory of the thoughts and 
actions that contribute to the current `time of troubles' in Eastern Europe. 
 
Among the affirmations, the following are noted: That the Catholic and Orthodox 
Churches continue to recognize each other as sister churches, responsible together for 
maintaining the Church of God in fidelity to the divine purpose, most especially in what 
concerns unity; that the Eastern Catholic Churches should be "inserted, on both local and 
universal levels, into the dialogue of love, in mutual respect and reciprocal trust found 
once again, and enter into the theological dialogue, with all its practical implications"; 
that there be reciprocal exchanges of information about various pastoral projects and 
cooperation between bishops and all those with responsibilities in the Churches; that 
those in charge of the communities concerned "should create joint local commissions or 
make effective those which already exist, for finding solutions to concrete problems and 
seeing that these solutions are applied in truth and love, in justice and peace"; that 
bishops and priests have the duty before God to respect the authority which the holy 
Spirit has given the bishops and priests of the other Church and for that reason to avoid 
interfering in the spiritual life of the faithful of that Church; that the formation of future 
priests and of all those who are involved in an apostolic activity carried on in a place 
where the other Church traditionally has its roots should be objectively positive with 
respect to that other Church; that the Churches come together in order to express 
gratitude and respect towards all, known and unknown, who suffered, confessed their 
faith, witnessed their fidelity to the Church and experienced persecution. [Text of Joint 
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